Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics', 'Evidence' and 'The Common-Sense View of Reality'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
20728 Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
20726 We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
20727 Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
20729 Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
20730 If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
20731 The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683 Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19685 Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3785 You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
3786 Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3784 Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3782 Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
3787 Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
3783 How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover]