Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal', 'Semantic Necessity' and 'Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer')'

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14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck]
Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo]