Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal', 'Realism and Anti-Realism' and 'Letter to Mersenne'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

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6 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

15049

Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett]

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

19566

Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth

19568

Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility

19567

The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

19570

Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will

3789	The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am [Descartes]