22 ideas
17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |