Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Language,Truth and Logic' and 'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


86 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer]
Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer]
All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer]
My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau]
Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer]
Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer]
Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer]
Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau]
Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau]
I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau]
Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau]
Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau]
Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau]
Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau]
Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau]
It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau]
Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau]
If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau]
What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau]
Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau]
If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / c. Religious Verification
The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer]