Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Essential vs Accidental Properties' and 'The Disorder of Things'

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
17377 All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
17376 We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
10940 An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
10939 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
10934 Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
17390 Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
10933 Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
10932 If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
17374 The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17378 Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17381 Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
17385 Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
17375 Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
17379 Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
17384 Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
17387 Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
17382 Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
17380 Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17383 Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
17386 The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]