Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation' and 'Things and Their Parts'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
15169 Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
15164 We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15180 There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15184 Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15172 Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
15181 Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15173 That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
15175 Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
15032 Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
15179 To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
15171 The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15167 Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle]
15177 Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15176 The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
15174 A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle]
15183 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
15165 A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
15168 That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
15166 Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
15182 Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
15178 Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]