Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages' and 'Beyond Good and Evil'

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84 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten]
Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski]
Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski]
Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady]
Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski]
Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski]
Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski]
Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack]
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H]
A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski]
Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read]
Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki]
Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee]
Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche]
A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche]
The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche]
A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche]