Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Why Propositions cannot be concrete' and 'On a supposed right to lie'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9086 The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
9087 Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
9085 If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
9084 Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
22442 If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
22441 The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder [Kant]