Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity', 'Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking)' and 'Mental Content'

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23 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17306 If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
17304 As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10502 We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
18258 We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
17308 Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
16784 Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
10499 We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
10501 A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
10500 No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23796 Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
23793 On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
23792 Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
23806 Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
23804 Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
23795 Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
23802 Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
23797 Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
23799 Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
23800 Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
23798 Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
17305 I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
17307 Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]