Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'The Ethics' and 'De Anima'

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243 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The wisdom of a free man is a meditation on life, not on death [Spinoza]
If we are not wholly wise, we should live by good rules and maxims [Spinoza]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Reason only explains what is universal, so it is timeless, under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza]
Reason perceives things under a certain form of eternity [Spinoza]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
In so far as men live according to reason, they will agree with one another [Spinoza]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist [Spinoza]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is its own standard [Spinoza]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Spinoza's life shows that love of truth which he proclaims as the highest value [MacIntyre on Spinoza]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
For Spinoza, 'adequacy' is the intrinsic mark of truth [Spinoza, by Scruton]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
If our ideas are adequate, what follows from them is also adequate [Spinoza]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics deals with the essences and properties of forms [Spinoza]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The sum of its angles follows from a triangle's nature [Spinoza]
The idea of a triangle involves truths about it, so those are part of its essence [Spinoza]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Outside the mind, there are just things and their properties [Spinoza]
The more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has [Spinoza]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
There must always be a reason or cause why some triangle does or does not exist [Spinoza]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Men say they prefer order, not realising that we imagine the order [Spinoza]
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Laws of nature are universal, so everything must be understood through those laws [Spinoza]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'attribute' is what the intellect takes as constituting an essence [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
The 'universal' term 'man' is just imagining whatever is the same in a multitude of men [Spinoza]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A thing is unified if its parts produce a single effect [Spinoza]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
Spinoza implies that thought is impossible without the notion of substance [Spinoza, by Scruton]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance is the power of self-actualisation [Spinoza, by Lord]
Substance is that of which an independent conception can be formed [Spinoza]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle]
Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
The essence of a thing is what is required for it to exist or be conceived [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence gives existence and conception to things, and is inseparable from them [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
All natures of things produce some effect [Spinoza]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Only an external cause can destroy something [Spinoza]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
There cannot be two substances with the same attributes [Spinoza]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Things are impossible if they imply contradiction, or their production lacks an external cause [Spinoza]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza]
Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent [Spinoza]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Necessity is in reference to essence or to cause [Spinoza]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza]
Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Spinoza's three levels of knowledge are perception/imagination, then principles, then intuitions [Spinoza, by Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the sole aim of reason, and the only profit for the mind [Spinoza]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Unlike Descartes' atomism, Spinoza held a holistic view of belief [Spinoza, by Schmid]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
True ideas intrinsically involve the highest degree of certainty [Spinoza]
You only know you are certain of something when you actually are certain of it [Spinoza]
A man who assents without doubt to a falsehood is not certain, but lacks a cause to make him waver [Spinoza]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
'I think' is useless, because it is contingent, and limited to the first person [Spinoza, by Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle]
Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle]
Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle]
Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares]
Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle]
Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
If the body is affected by an external object, the mind can't help believing that the object exists [Spinoza]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle]
The eyes of the mind are proofs [Spinoza]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Once we have experienced two feelings together, one will always give rise to the other [Spinoza]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle]
Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Knowledge is the essence of the mind [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle]
Will and intellect are the same thing [Spinoza]
The will is finite, but the intellect is infinite [Spinoza]
The will is not a desire, but the faculty of affirming what is true or false [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi]
Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle]
Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle]
The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle]
If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle]
If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle]
What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle]
Spinoza held that the mind is just a bundle of ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Animals are often observed to be wiser than people [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
To understand is the absolute virtue of the mind [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Faculties are either fictions, or the abstract universals of ideas [Spinoza]
If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
If the body is affected by two things together, the imagining of one will conjure up the other [Spinoza]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Our own force of persevering is nothing in comparison with external forces [Spinoza]
As far as possible, everything tries to persevere [Spinoza]
The conatus (striving) of mind and body together is appetite, which is the essence of man [Spinoza]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The mind only knows itself by means of ideas of the modification of the body [Spinoza]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
The poet who forgot his own tragedies was no longer the same man [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
An act of will can only occur if it has been caused, which implies a regress of causes [Spinoza]
'Free will' is a misunderstanding arising from awareness of our actions, but ignorance of their causes [Spinoza]
Would we die if we lacked free will, and were poised between equal foods? Yes! [Spinoza]
The mind is not free to remember or forget anything [Spinoza]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
We think we are free because we don't know the causes of our desires and choices [Spinoza]
The actual world is the only one God could have created [Spinoza]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle]
All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Ideas and things have identical connections and order [Spinoza]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle]
Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle]
Mind and body are one thing, seen sometimes as thought and sometimes as extension [Spinoza]
We are incapable of formulating an idea which excludes the existence of our body [Spinoza]
If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza]
The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Emotion is a modification of bodily energy, controlling our actions [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain and desire [Spinoza]
The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire [Spinoza, by Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Minds are subject to passions if they have inadequate ideas [Spinoza]
An emotion is only bad if it hinders us from thinking [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Stoics want to suppress emotions, but Spinoza overcomes them with higher emotions [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
An emotion comes more under our control in proportion to how well it is known to us [Spinoza]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid]
An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza]
Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza]
An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Spinoza argues that in reality the will and the intellect are 'one and the same' [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
Claiming that actions depend on the will is meaningless; no one knows what the will is [Spinoza]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Whenever we act, then desire is our very essence [Spinoza]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We love or hate people more strongly because we think they are free [Spinoza]
We are the source of an action if only our nature can explain the action [Spinoza]
We act when it follows from our nature, and is understood in that way [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza]
We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza]
By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza]
Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre]
If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza]
Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle]
Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Reason demands nothing contrary to nature, and so it demands self-love [Spinoza]
Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Both virtue and happiness are based on the preservation of one's own being [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
To act virtuously is to act rationally [Spinoza]
The more we strive for our own advantage, the more virtuous we are [Spinoza]
All virtue is founded on self-preservation [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
To live according to reason is to live according to the laws of human nature [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
A man ignorant of himself is ignorant of all of the virtues [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
In a free man, choosing flight can show as much strength of mind as fighting [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza]
Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza]
Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza]
People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Rational people judge money by needs, and live contented with very little [Spinoza]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Rational people are self-interested, but also desire the same goods for other people [Spinoza]
A rational person will want others to have the goods he seeks for himself [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
If people are obedient to reason, they will live in harmony [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The ideal for human preservation is unanimity among people [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Only self-knowledge can liberate us [Spinoza, by MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Spinoza extended Hobbes's natural rights to cover all possible desires and actions [Spinoza, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery is a disgraceful crime [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
The best use of talent is to teach other people to live rationally [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is impossible that the necessity of a person's nature should produce a desire for non-existence [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals feel, but that doesn't mean we can't use them for our pleasure and profit [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle]
We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza]
For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza]
Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle]
Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle]
Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle]
If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The key question for Spinoza is: is his God really a God? [Stewart,M on Spinoza]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God feels no emotions, of joy or sorrow [Spinoza]
God does not act according to the freedom of the will [Spinoza]
God is a substance with infinite attributes [Spinoza]
Spinoza's God is just power and necessity, without perfection or wisdom [Leibniz on Spinoza]
Spinoza's God is not a person [Spinoza, by Jolley]
God is wholly without passions, and strictly speaking does not love anyone [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
God is the sum and principle of all eternal laws [Spinoza, by Armstrong,K]
God is not loveable for producing without choice and by necessity; God is loveable for his goodness [Leibniz on Spinoza]
God has no purpose, because God lacks nothing [Spinoza]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
To say that God promotes what is good is false, as it sets up a goal beyond God [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Spinoza says a substance of infinite attributes cannot fail to exist [Spinoza, by Lord]
Denial of God is denial that his essence involves existence, which is absurd [Spinoza]
God is being as such, and you cannot conceive of the non-existence of being [Spinoza, by Lord]
God must necessarily exist, because no reason can be given for his non-existence [Spinoza]
Some things makes me conceive of it as a thing whose essence requires its existence [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence [Spinoza]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Priests reject as heretics anyone who tries to understand miracles in a natural way [Spinoza]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
That God is the substance of all things is an ill-reputed doctrine [Leibniz on Spinoza]
The human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God [Spinoza]
God is the efficient cause of essences, as well as of existences [Spinoza]
Everything is in God, and nothing exists or is thinkable without God [Spinoza]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
In Spinoza, one could substitute 'nature' or 'substance' for the word 'God' throughout [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Spinoza's theory of mind implies that there is no immortality [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
After death, something eternal remains of the mind [Spinoza]