99 ideas
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| 13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
| 13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
| 2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
| 2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
| 2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
| 13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
| 2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| 13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
| 13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
| 13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
| 13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| 13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
| 2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| 2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| 13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
| 13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
| 13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
| 2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
| 13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
| 2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
| 2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
| 2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
| 2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
| 2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
| 2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
| 2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
| 2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
| 2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
| 2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
| 2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
| 2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
| 2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
| 2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
| 2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
| 2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
| 2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
| 2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
| 2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
| 2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
| 2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
| 2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
| 2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
| 2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
| 2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
| 2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
| 2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
| 2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
| 2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
| 2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
| 2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
| 2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
| 2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |