55 ideas
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
23308 | Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
5771 | Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius] |
5767 | Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius] |
5769 | Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius] |
5768 | God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius] |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
5762 | The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius] |
5770 | Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius] |
5764 | When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius] |
5756 | Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius] |
5763 | The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius] |
5759 | Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius] |
5754 | You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius] |
16692 | Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius] |
5752 | Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius] |
5757 | God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius] |
5758 | God is the good [Boethius] |
5760 | The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius] |
5753 | The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius] |
5765 | The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius] |
5761 | God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius] |
5766 | If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius] |