Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Mind and Its Place in Nature' and 'Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]