27 ideas
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
16648 | Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus] |
15386 | If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
15387 | If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
16632 | We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus] |
13094 | The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16770 | It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus] |
10919 | What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
16768 | Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus] |
9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |