29 ideas
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |