14 ideas
| 14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
| 14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
| 14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |