23 ideas
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
299 | What is fine is always difficult [Plato] |
297 | What is fine is the parent of goodness [Plato] |
14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
298 | While sex is very pleasant, it should be in secret, as it looks contemptible [Plato] |