Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'The Limits of Reason'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
3993 Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18696 The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
18701 The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18694 Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3991 Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18692 Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
18693 Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
18695 An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
18700 Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
18698 Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
3995 A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3994 Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3992 Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3996 Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18697 A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]