Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Emotivism' and 'Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions'

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14 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre]
Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre]
Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J]