31 ideas
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
15391 | A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality [Robb] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
15392 | If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts [Robb] |
5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |