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All the ideas for 'Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity', 'Human, All Too Human' and 'Problems of Philosophy'

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147 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell]
Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche]
A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell]
Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell]
If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell]
Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell]
That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell]
Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell]
Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell]
All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver]
Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H]
There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell]
Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell]
As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell]
If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell]
We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling]
'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson]
It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell]
We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG]
Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell]
True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell]
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell]
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell]
Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell]
Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD]
Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche]
Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche]
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche]
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche]
Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche]
Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche]
Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell]
Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche]
The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche]
Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche]
Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche]