Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Structuralism' and 'Mathematical logic and theory of types'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
11064 Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
6407 The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
8921 Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
8922 Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10418 Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell]
10047 Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave]
23478 Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
21718 Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
18126 A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock]
18128 Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock]
18124 Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]