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All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Elements of the Philosophy of Right' and 'Philosophy of Mathematics'

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114 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom emerges at the end of a process [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is exploration of the rational [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Subjective and objective are not firmly opposed, but merge into one another [Hegel]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock]
The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock]
ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock]
The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock]
Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock]
There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock]
Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock]
Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock]
Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock]
Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock]
Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock]
A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock]
Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock]
Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock]
If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock]
If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock]
The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock]
The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Personality overcomes subjective limitations and posits Dasein as its own [Hegel]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
It is a rejection of intellectual dignity to say that we cannot know the truth [Hegel]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
A person is a being which is aware of its own self-directed and free subjectivity [Hegel]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A human only become a somebody as a member of a social estate [Hegel]
Individuals attain their right by discovering their self-consciousness in institutions [Hegel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the will is the free will which wills its freedom [Hegel]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Evil enters a good will when we believe we are doing right, but allow no criticism of our choice [Hegel, by Houlgate]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
You can't have a morality which is supplied by the individual, but is also genuinely universal [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Be a person, and respect other persons [Hegel]
The categorical imperative lacks roots in a historical culture [Hegel, by Bowie]
The categorical imperative is fine if you already have a set of moral principles [Hegel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The good is realised freedom [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The family is the first basis of the state, but estates are a necessary second [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
We cannot assert rights which are unnatural [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
I aim to portray the state as a rational entity [Hegel]
Society draws people, and requires their work, making them wholly dependent on it [Hegel]
The state is the march of God in the world [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Individuals can't leave the state, because they are natural citizens, and humans require a state [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A fully developed state is conscious and knows what it wills [Hegel]
The people do not have the ability to know the general will [Hegel]
The great man of the ages is the one who reveals and accomplishes the will of his time [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A constitution embodies a nation's rights and condition [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Individuals must dedicate themselves to the ethical whole, and give their lives when asked [Hegel]
Social groups must focus on the state, which must in turn respect their inclusion and their will [Hegel]
People can achieve respect for their state by insight into its essence [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
In the 1840s Hegel seemed to defend society being right as it is, as a manifestation of Mind [Hegel, by Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Majority rule means obligations can be imposed on me [Hegel]
The state should reflect all interests, and not just popular will, or a popular party [Hegel, by Houlgate]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In modern states an individual's actions should be their choice [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Moral individuals become ethical when they see the social aspect of a matter [Hegel, by Houlgate]
For Hegel, the moral life can only be led within a certain type of community [Hegel, by MacIntyre]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Even educated women are unsuited to science, philosophy, art and government [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slaves have no duties because they have no rights [Hegel]
Slaves are partly responsible for their own condition [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
True liberal freedom is to pursue something, while being free to cease the pursuit [Hegel, by Houlgate]
People assume they are free, but the options available are not under their control [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Freedom requires us to submit to a family, or a corporation, or a state [Hegel, by Houlgate]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Money is the best way to achieve just equality [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights imply duties, and duties imply rights [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Man has an absolute right to appropriate things [Hegel]
Because only human beings can own property, everything else can become our property [Hegel]
A community does not have the property-owning rights that a person has [Hegel]
The owner of a thing is obviously the first person to freely take possession of it [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Wars add strength to a nation, and cure internal dissension [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Children need discipline, to break their self-will and eradicate sensuousness [Hegel]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
To have pagan beliefs and be a pagan are quite different [Hegel]
Some religions lead to harsh servitude and the debasement of human beings [Hegel]