Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Calculus Ratiocinator' and 'Philosophy of Mathematics'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo]
To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz]