Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'In Defense of Absolute Essentialism' and 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]