Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Logic and Conversation' and 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
23295 Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
23298 Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
23297 The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
23296 We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
13856 Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
8948 The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
13767 Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14277 A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]