32 ideas
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |