Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Recent Debates on the A Priori' and 'Philosophy of Logic'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
18951 For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
18953 Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
18949 The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
18952 '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
18958 In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
18954 Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
18956 Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
18962 Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
18961 We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
18955 Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
9226 If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
18959 Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
18957 Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
18950 Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
18960 Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam]