12 ideas
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |