10 ideas
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |