Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Metaphysics of Causation', 'True in Theory, but not in Practice' and 'Phil Applications of Cognitive Science'

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47 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant]
There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant]
A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J]
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J]
There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J]
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J]
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J]
Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J]
Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J]
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J]
If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J]
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J]
Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J]
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J]
If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J]
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J]
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J]