Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Nietzsche's System' and 'Sophistical Refutations'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson]
Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson]
Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson]
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson]