Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Events and Their Names' and 'The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


9 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael]
Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael]