Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal' and 'World and Essence'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]