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All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Purple Haze' and 'Elements of Geometry'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof reveals the interdependence of truths, as well as showing their certainty [Euclid, by Frege]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
If you pick an arbitrary triangle, things proved of it are true of all triangles [Euclid, by Lemmon]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Euclid's geometry is synthetic, but Descartes produced an analytic version of it [Euclid, by Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
An assumption that there is a largest prime leads to a contradiction [Euclid, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
A unit is that according to which each existing thing is said to be one [Euclid]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Postulate 2 says a line can be extended continuously [Euclid, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid relied on obvious properties in diagrams, as well as on his axioms [Potter on Euclid]
Euclid's parallel postulate defines unique non-intersecting parallel lines [Euclid, by Friend]
Euclid needs a principle of continuity, saying some lines must intersect [Shapiro on Euclid]
Euclid says we can 'join' two points, but Hilbert says the straight line 'exists' [Euclid, by Bernays]
Modern geometries only accept various parts of the Euclid propositions [Russell on Euclid]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Euclid's common notions or axioms are what we must have if we are to learn anything at all [Euclid, by Roochnik]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau]
Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau]
Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine]