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All the ideas for 'Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity', 'Philosophy' and 'Sameness and Substance'

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45 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth is what unites, and the profound truths create a community [Jaspers]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J]
As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Freedom needs knowledge, the possibility of arbitrariness, and law [Jaspers]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
My freedom increases as I broaden my vision of possiblities and motives [Jaspers]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The struggle for Existenz is between people who are equals, and are utterly honest [Jaspers]
My helplessness in philosophising reveals my being, and begins its upsurge [Jaspers]
Once we grasp freedom 'from' things, then freedom 'for' things becomes urgent [Jaspers]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
'Existenz' is the potential being, which I could have, and ought to have [Jaspers]
Mundane existence is general, falling under universals, but Existens is unique to individuals [Jaspers]
We want the correct grasp on being that is neither solipsism nor absorption in the crowd [Jaspers]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Every decision I make moves towards or away from fulfilled Existenz [Jaspers]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]