Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism' and 'Principia Ethica'

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21 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
12295 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
12298 Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
12296 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
18882 You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
12297 Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]