41 ideas
| 21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
| 21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
| 13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
| 21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
| 21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
| 21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
| 13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
| 21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
| 21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
| 13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
| 21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
| 21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
| 21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
| 13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
| 13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
| 13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
| 21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
| 13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
| 22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
| 13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
| 21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
| 21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
| 13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
| 13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
| 13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
| 13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
| 21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
| 21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
| 21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
| 21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
| 21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
| 21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
| 21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
| 21511 | A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour] |
| 21510 | The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour] |
| 21505 | A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour] |
| 21504 | The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour] |
| 21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
| 21508 | Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour] |
| 6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |