Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy' and 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
19441 All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19442 I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
6979 Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
6983 Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
6980 Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
14707 Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
19445 A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
19444 Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
19443 Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
7005 Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
6994 Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
6984 Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
6978 Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
19446 To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
6993 Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
6987 We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
6988 Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
6975 Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
19447 The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
6982 Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
6991 We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
6976 In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
6986 Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6992 If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
6996 Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6977 Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
6990 Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
6985 Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
6995 Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
6989 I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
6998 Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
6997 Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
7000 Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
6999 It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]