Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'On Certainty' and 'Letters to Bentley'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
13152 We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
13151 Not all infinites are equal [Newton]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
3597 Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3596 Total doubt can't even get started [Wittgenstein, by Williams,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
4721 If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
15863 The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
8340 I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
13150 The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
12178 That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]