38 ideas
| 13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
| 13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
| 4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
| 13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
| 4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| 4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
| 4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
| 4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
| 4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
| 4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
| 4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
| 10751 | Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg] |
| 10757 | Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg] |
| 10759 | There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg] |
| 10753 | Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg] |
| 10752 | Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg] |
| 4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
| 10754 | In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg] |
| 10756 | A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg] |
| 10758 | If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg] |
| 10761 | Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg] |
| 10755 | A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg] |
| 13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
| 13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
| 13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
| 13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
| 13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
| 13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
| 13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
| 13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
| 4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
| 4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
| 4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
| 13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
| 4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
| 4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
| 4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |