Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causation and Laws of Nature', 'Truth' and 'Wittgenstein'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

14 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
14600 Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
10838 To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
14603 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
10837 It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
10840 We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19171 Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14607 T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
14604 If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
14599 Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
14605 Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14601 Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14606 Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
7091 The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
10839 You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett]