53 ideas
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
17306 | If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J] |
17304 | As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
17308 | Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J] |
7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
17305 | I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
17307 | Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J] |
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |