Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'I.7 Our deeds are judged by intention' and 'Plurals and Complexes'

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13734 Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13751 If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
13743 We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10676 The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack]
10686 The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10687 Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
10677 Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10671 Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10666 Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
10675 A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
10669 Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
10673 Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
10680 The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10684 I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10674 A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10685 Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack]
10681 In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
13741 If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
13748 Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
13747 Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
13744 The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
10668 We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
13739 Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
10664 Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
10678 The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13742 There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
13752 The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
10665 Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
10682 The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
13749 Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
13740 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
10663 A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
7496 Rules and duties are based on the will, as that is all we control [Montaigne]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
10683 We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack]