13 ideas
22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |