65 ideas
17240 | Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes] |
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
14001 | People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
17237 | Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes] |
17239 | Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes] |
17241 | A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes] |
17242 | 'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes] |
13991 | Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian] |
17245 | A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes] |
17258 | If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
17253 | Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
16670 | Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes] |
16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
16734 | The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes] |
17247 | The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes] |
14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
17248 | If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes] |
16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
17233 | Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes] |
17246 | Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes] |
17251 | The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes] |
17257 | It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes] |
12853 | Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes] |
17256 | If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes] |
16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
17255 | Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes] |
16582 | We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
14002 | Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
17238 | Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes] |
17260 | Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes] |
19373 | A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R] |
2948 | Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes] |
17261 | Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes] |
17236 | Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes] |
14000 | 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian] |
16600 | Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes] |
17252 | Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes] |
17254 | An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes] |
17235 | A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes] |
17234 | Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes] |
17259 | 'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes] |
13990 | Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian] |
13992 | Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian] |
13994 | Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian] |
13995 | Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian] |
13996 | Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian] |
13997 | Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian] |
13993 | Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian] |
17243 | Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes] |
13998 | Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian] |
13999 | People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian] |