Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson', 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority' and 'Utilitarianism'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14082 No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14081 Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
3772 The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
3769 With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3767 Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
3771 Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3768 Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
7202 The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill]
5935 Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill]
3764 Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill]
3776 Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
3765 Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill]
3763 Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill]
3766 Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
3770 General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
6697 Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
3774 Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill]
3773 No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
3775 A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill]