34 ideas
6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |