18 ideas
14508 | A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM] |
14511 | There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
13952 | Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R] |
12031 | Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM] |
13954 | The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R] |
13955 | Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R] |
13953 | An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
12034 | If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM] |
14510 | Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM] |
16455 | Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM] |
14507 | Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM] |
11964 | Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar] |
16451 | Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
11901 | Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P] |
14512 | Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM] |
12032 | Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM] |